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Creation, Procreation and the Gift. of L. fe 
Richard Sherlock 
This essay arises out of a con-
cern with a certain noticeable 
trend in current discussions of 
proposals to limit population. The 
vast majority of the proposals and 
material that I have studied are 
concerned essentially with the 
elimination of procreation for 
either the whole of mankind or 
Mr. Sherlock holds an M.T.S. 
degree from the Harvard Divinity 
School and is presently in the 
third year of a Ph.D. program in 
R eligious Ethics at Harvard. His 
article challenges the utilitarian 
doctrines which have been ad-
vanced concerning procreative ob-
ligations. 
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selected groups such as "u !er-
developed" societies, poor >m-
munities, etc. Most of thes( >ro-
posals and the supporting re ons 
involve a teleological orien1 ion 
to the production of incr sed 
good, much the same as in c ssl-
cal utilitarian theory. The r~- t or 
the obligatory is defined in rms 
of the maximization of thf ~d 
and once the element or ele. ·nts 
preventing such maximizati1 are 
uncovered the moral path is ear. 
Overpopulation p r e v en t . the 
maximization of the good ' the 
greatest happiness for the eat-
est number" was the ch . ical 
utilitarian formulation) and ~nee 
population reduction becorr , the 
overriding obligation. Almm· ,my-
thing may be and often is anc-
tioned in its behalf by thos who 
keep forecasting catastr·· Jhes. 
This is utilitarian theory .;t its 
boldest. To use Kierkegaar .· 's fa-
mous phrase thi s invol ' ~s a 
teleological suspension o! any 
ethical considerations othe1 than 
the pursuit of beneficience. Any-
thing that stands in the way of 
maximization of the good is either 
ignored or condemned.1 
I propose to sketch an alterna-
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tive that centers around a notion 
of procreative obligations and is 
based upon a fundamentally dif-
ferent view of moral obligation 
and of the relation between the 
right and the good. To do this I 
shall use some of the central 
cosmic symbols of the Jewish and 
Christian religions. However, this 
does not presuppose the necessity 
of being a believer for this argu-
ment to be persuasive. I have 
used these symbols because I find 
them helpful in presenting the 
argument and in making clear the 
case being made; but I am fully 
persuaded that this case can be 
made without any explicit refer-
ence to Christian or Jewi sh 
theism. 
As a starting point for my argu-
ment I will present the utilitarian 
conclusion on procreation from 
one of its boldest contemporary 
defenders. On this basis it will 
then be clearer just where these 
views are different and what the 
difficulties of the utilitarian posi-
tion are. 
In a pair of recent articles J an 
Narveson has argued vigorously 
for the utilitarian conclusions on 
procreative i s s u e s , particularly 
with respect to those issues I am 
directly concerned with - obliga-
tions to procreate.2 I have anum-
ber of difficulties about Narve-
son's arguments, most of which I 
will not detail here since the pur-
pose of this article is to argue for 
a completely different approach. 
What I will do is present the bas-
ics of his arguments against pro-
creative obligations. Following 
this, we shall he in a position to 
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see the difficulties in this argu-
ment. 
Narveson's position, when 
stripped of the verbiage that in-
evitably accompanies philosophi-
cal work, involves the rejection of 
any positive moral significance for 
procreation. To arrive at this 
overall result Narveson has two 
essential sub-results: 1) the rejec-
t ion of procreative obligations vis-
a-vis t he unborn child on logical 
grounds, and 2) the rejection of 
it vis-a-vis overall societal hap-
piness on considerations arising 
from u tilitarian theory.J 
The first objection is fairly sim-
ple. Although it would seem cer-
tain to pose serious difficulties, I 
sha ll not argue it here. Narveson 
accepts a referential theory of 
meaning from Strawson and 
Quine and proceeds to argue that 
statements about an unborn (or 
unconceived) child make no 
sense. For example, the statement 
"Jones will be happier when he 
is born than he is now" is logical-
ly nonsensical since "Jones" does 
not refer to anyone. Narveson 
tries to show that such considera-
tions rule out talk about the right 
of the unborn to be boin (since 
this involves rights without bear-
ers) ; furthermore, he argues, this 
does not allow us to posit any ob-
ligation to procreate based on the 
happiness of the child since it 
would always involve at the same 
point the idea that X's happiness 
will be increased and this involves 
precisely the nonsensical state-
ment above. 4 
Having thus supposedly ruled 
out any attempt to argue that t he 
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child's happiness or rights can be 
invoked Narveson's next move is 
to show that considerations of 
general social happiness would 
not produce these results from a 
utilitarian premise. To begin with 
Narveson seems to dismiss those 
views that focus their attention 
on total social happiness. Such 
positions as this can be very hard 
on minorities. For example, sup-
pose we could increase total so-
cial happiness a hundredfold with 
certain forms of slavery. Total 
happiness arguments do not give 
one very much support for coun-
tering such a venture; it can be 
argued persuasively that they 
provide no reason at all to protest 
such a program. s 
Furthermore, Narveson argues 
against the notion that the par-
ticular happiness of the members 
of the society will be directly in-
creased. Adding new people to 
the society, even if these new-
comers are happy, will not add 
anything to the happiness of the 
members already there. If there 
is a society of 100 members each 
with X happiness, then adding 
another 100 people will not logi-
cally increase the individual hap-
piness from X to X-plus-1 or 
something greater.6 The only 
possible alternative would be a 
"total happiness" or "lump sum" 
view that, as we just saw, has a 
number of serious difficulties at-
tached to it. Thus Narveson 
draws this conclusion: "the argu-
ment that an increase in general 
happiness will result from our 
having a happy child involves 
. precisely the same fallacy as he 
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had just given in an exampl If 
you ask 'whose happiness tas 
been increased as a result o 1is 
having been born?' the ans.,.; is 
that nobody's has. Of courst '1IS 
being born might have inc '!ct 
effects on the general happ. ess 
but that is quite another m< er. 
The general populace is ju as 
happy as it was before.' '7 
'Indirect Benefits' Citer 
Narveson is willing to r er-
tain th.e notion that some S} 10ff 
benefits (he calls them inl ect 
benefitS) may come fron in-
creased population. Some ! ne-
fits that he lists are indus 1ali-
zation and its . attendant cial 
advancement which he says nay 
increase social happiness. !\ -ve-
son does not really develor this 
argument very far, and for ood 
reason. This argument abot in-
direct benefits does not Sef •1 to 
get away from the difficult ·s of 
total happiness views, or if t is 
meant to, Narveson neve ex-
plains how. 
Finally, Narveson is um•. lling 
to posit any independent 1 wral 
value to the existence of h e it-
self. To do so would involve his 
teleological system in diffic·•lt ies 
that he is trying to avoid: For 
him to stress the intrinsic good-
ness of life would on the face of 
it force him to argue for con-
tinued u n 1 i mite d procreat ion 
since his utilitarian theory posits 
obligation in terms of the maxi-
mization of the good. This is pre-
cisely what Narveson is t rying to 
avoid in his essays. An admission 
that life itself is an intrinsic good 
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would open up the argument all 
over again. 
The result of his discussion is 
that he cannot find any positive 
moral obligation that could lead 
one to procreate: "Is it ever one's 
duty to have children? I can 
think of only one case where it 
night. If it can be shown that the 
populace will suffer if its size is 
not increased then it seems to me 
that one could perhaps require 
efforts in that direction and pun-
ish those who could comply but 
do not. But I am inclined to 
think that such a situation is ex-
ceedingly rare.''8 There are a 
number of difficulties with this 
conclusion, particularly in light 
of Narveson's earlier arguments, 
that I cannot discuss here. Par-
ticularly crucial are the diffi-
culties with minorities that were 
pointed to earlier, a difficulty 
that is explicitly opened up here. 
What I am concerned with is t hat 
Narveson's utilitarian ethics does 
not give any positive moral sig-
nificance to the procreation and 
nurture of new life. This will be 
the focus of our discussion. 
Narveson , and those who think 
as he does in the discussion of 
population problems, opera t e s 
with the view that the only moral 
obligations that anyone has are 
teleologically oriented duties to 
Produce future benefits. The only 
relation in which we stand to oth-
ers is that of benefactor to bene-
fited. The duty to increase the 
happiness of others is our only 
duty (Narveson is never clear 
about duties to oneself). Since 
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talk of increasing the happiness 
of the unborn child is meaning-
less to him and since it is very 
problematic to argue for the in-
creased happiness of the society 
except in a morally dangerous 
way, procreation is not an obliga-
tion that one could have; it is re-
duced simply to a matter of taste 
or personal enjoyment much like 
eating candy or going to the 
movies.9 It is my contention that 
this line of reasoning, which 
focuses only on future benefits, 
is widespread in the current lit-
erature on t he "population prob-
lem" and in programs to prevent 
population growth. Furthermore, 
I think that it displays a some-
what unsophisticated analysis of 
the nature of moral obligation 
and the various obligations that 
each of us is confronted with. In 
the remainder of this essay I 
want to suggest an alternative 
view that is beter equipped than 
Narveson's to handle these issues. 
An Alternative View 
One of the central affirmations 
of the Jewish and Christian tra-
ditions is that life is a gift. In a 
recent important paper, Talcott 
Parsons has written, " In the 
Judeo-Christian tradition andes-
pecially in the Christian phase 
life for the individual is defined 
in the first instance as a gift.'' 10 
The first act of God as recorded 
in the Bible is that of creation; a 
free act unmerited by anything 
that His creatures may have done 
previously. The creation of man 
is seen as the pinnacle of this cre-
ation; to him is giveri the gift of 
41 
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life in a most profound sense. Hu-
man life is the greatest gift of 
God. Furthermore God is pre-
sented as centrally concerned 
with the creation of those social 
and communal supports of human 
life that are basic to its preserva-
tion. As Parsons and his collabo-
rators have noted, God creates 
both the biological life of man 
and the sociological life of man, 
the community of Israel. In both 
of these cases the basic elements 
necessary for the continuation of 
life on this planet are seen essen-
tially as gifts given to man which 
he never earned and never was 
given as a reward . 
That each of us exists at all as 
independent selves is not any of 
our own doing. Our lives are in a 
very real sense not our own; we did 
not purchase them or demand 
that they be given to us as re-
wards or medals. Our lives are the 
result of the gifts of others: par-
ents who gave us birth and who 
nurtured us when we were young; 
teachers, friends, associates who 
have all nurtured and sustained 
us. An interconnected network of 
persons, institutions and cultural 
systems that make up our society 
has brought each of us into being 
and continues to nourish and sup-
port our lives. Without this mas-
sive bio-social matrix none of us 
would eXist. This overarching bio-
social organism has made life pos-
sible for us and for the millions 
who have gone before. In a rich 
and suggestive passage, the great 
English political theorist Edmund 
Burke provides a superb picture 
of this bio-social matrix that nur-
42 
tures and sustains human :e: 
Society is indeed a contra< Sub-
ordinate contracts for obJ ..s of 
m e re cccasional interest r y be 
dissolved at pleasure - I the 
state ought not to be consilf d as 
nothing better than a part rship 
agreement in ·a trade of pep r and 
coffee, calico or tobacco c some 
other s uch low concern, to I aken 
up for a little temporary erest 
and to be dissolved by th fancy 
of the parties. It is to b( •oked 
upon with other reverence: ::ause 
it is not a partne rship i1 hings 
subservient only to the gr• am· 
mal existence of a tempor 1 and 
pe rishable nature. 
It is a partnership in all ience; 
a partnership in all art; a • rtner· 
ship in every virtue a nd in I per· 
fection. As the ends of such part· 
nership cannot be obtained many 
generations it becomes a 1 rtner· 
ship not only between th· who 
a re living but be tween th who 
are dead and those who a to be 
born. 
Each contract of each p · 
state is but a clause in tl 
primeval contract of e te r 
ciety, linking the lower v 
higher natures, connecting 
ble with the invisible worl rl 
ing to a fixed compact s11 
by the inviolable oath wh r 
all physical and a ll mora l 
each in their appointed p 
The Bio-Social Mat! 
icula r 
great 
l l so· 
h the 
e visi · 
ccord· 
t ioned 
holds 
,a tures 
·e. rr 
" Society is not simply ar a tom-
istic collection of individm. · each 
relating to one another a~ bene-
factors and benefited. I t is an 
elaborate matrix of socic; l, cul-
tural and biological elements that 
has given each of us the gift of 
life, for which we owe the most 
profound debt of gratitude. If life 
is seen as a gift then each of us 
are debtors with respect to the 
bio-social matrix that has given 
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that life. The result of this view 
is that we stand in a relation to 
this societal matrix that Narve-
son and those who think as he 
does are unable to take account 
of adequately. Classical utilitar-
ian theory of Narveson's variety 
is only able to see morally signifi-
cant relations to those whom one 
may benefit. Obligations then 
arise out of a possible future be-
.otowal of benefits to others. In 
this scheme a morally significant 
relation, or further, a definite ob-
ligation cannot arise out of a sit-
uation of a gift or a debt. These 
are oblig~tions that have no par-
ticular reference to any future 
benefits which may accrue from 
the fulfillment of them. These ob-
ligations stress the continuity of 
Present not only with the future 
but with the past. But in the 
utilitarian framework in which 
Narveson operates, obligations 
arising out of gifts that one has 
been given in the past are simply 
not accounted for. 
In this way Narveson and 
those who think as he does cannot 
account for one's relation to the 
bio-social matrix that has nour-
ished him as morally significant 
except insofar as one may benefit 
it in the future by reducing pop-
ulation. The good has been de-
termined as t h e reduction of 
population and obligations simply 
follow along. The overriding con-
cern for the maximization of the 
good does not allow any other 
conflicting obligations to temper 
t~e pursuit of supposed bene-
ficence. Narveson, as we saw, al-
allowed some exceptions where 
February, 1975 
positive harm to individuals may 
result but in the process he al-
lowed for a dubious outcome in 
relation to minorities. 
Narveson and those who think 
as he does are thus unable to see 
the profound debt of gratitude 
that the gift of life creates for 
all those who have received it. It 
is my contention that a closer ex-
amination of the many morally 
significant relations that impinge 
on persons in society will reveal 
a far greater range of such rela-
tions than simply that of bene-
factor to beneficiaries. Persons 
stand in many relationships to 
each other - debtor to creditor, 
promiser to promisee, etc.-which 
simply cannot be understood in 
the framework of utilitarianism. 
It is this inability to deal ade-
quately with a number of prima 
facie duties that is the center of 
our difficulty with Narveson and . 
other utilitarian population theor-
ists. 12 Lacking this perspective, 
utilitarians can find no independ-
ent basis for any obligation to 
repay the debt of gratitude crea-
ted by the gift of life. Past actions 
of others or ourselves can never 
create moral obligations; only the 
possible production of future good 
can do that. An excellent example 
of this line of thought is from Dr. 
Edgar Chasteen, a sociologist who 
is on the Board of Zero Popula-
tion Growth: 
W e live in a finite world. Whatever 
the number of people it is capable 
of s upporting there is a limit. We 
do know that our world is doing a 
pretty poor job of supporting its 
present population of a round 31J2 
43 
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billion. How long can we expect to 
double world population every 35 
years? To what end? In what ways 
will we be better off with 7 billion 
people than with 31h billion? What 
possible advantages are there in 
even minima l growth? Scores of 
disadvantages come r eadily to mind 
but not a single benefit. The s tork 
is not the bird of paradise.13 
Aside from the dubious factual 
assumptions and perhaps errors 
made by this author, this is pure 
utilitarianism at its boldest. The 
calculus of benefits and harms is 
the measuring rod of all moral 
obligations. Once the proper cal-
culations have been made, which 
Chasteen thinks are obvious, pop-
ulation growth limitation can be 
endorsed with full vigor. 
'Duties of Gratitude' 
But this position is unable to 
see other sources of moral obliga-
tion in human life. One of these 
that has been separated and 
analyzed by certain moral phi-
losophers ar~ duties that arise 
out of previous services that have 
been rendered to us. Gifts or serv-
ices t hat have been rendered to 
us create what W. D. Ross has 
called "Duties of Gratitude."14 
For example, suppose my neigh-
bor saved my child's life by pull-
ing him out of the path of an on-
coming car. My gratitude for that 
act inay make it morally incum-
bent on me to spend time helping 
him repair his house, during 
which time I otherwise would be 
playing tennis or maybe helping 
someone else toward whom I had 
no particular debt of gratitude. 
These duties of gratitude are 
neither obscure nor complicated. 
44 
In fact the obligation to n ~ive 
gifts and, more significant} to 
repay gifts is very widely 1 :og-
nized in less advanced cult t ~. 1.; 
It was, for example, basic t the 
moral thought of the Old 'J sta-
ment and its ·· emphasis q; the 
covenant. 16 Furthermore 1ese 
obligations , are not equ. able 
with any generalized obligat n to 
do good. They are indepe :lent 
right-making characteristi of 
action that enable us, for mm-
ple, to see the obligation to 3pay 
a de.bt as more binding t m a 
general duty to help othe1 For 
example, suppose someon had 
ten dollars to give away tc ither 
of two friends, A or B, bt that 
he had promised the mone to A. 
It makes a great deal mon noral 
sense to say that one's obl a tion 
is to give the money to than 
it would to say that it ,esn't 
matter at all since the be fit of 
the outcome would be eqt. ' • i.e., 
someone will have ten do• rs he 
did not have. This last 1 sition 
is where Chasteen's unva ished 
focus on benefits and ·1orms 
would leave us. More sigro icant-
ly, suppose one had a te vision 
set to give away and everal 
neighbors to consider as recipi-
ents. But suppose that nne of 
them had just saved y0ur life. 
Chasteen's ( and Nan 0son's) 
utilitarianism would find no spe-
cial sense of moral obligation to 
give the gift to t he neighbor who 
saved your life. All neighbors are 
in the same relationship to you; 
they are possible recipients of 
your benefit. One might as well 
Linacre Quarterly 
draw lots f.or the gift. Unless we 
can see a range of obligations a 
good deal more complex than 
that, we are unable to account 
for the sense of obligation felt by 
a great many to give the gift to 
the neighbor who saved one's life. 
Without this we will simply miss 
a good many of the moral obli-
gations sensed, encountered and 
fulfilled in common huma~ ex-
perience. 
This analysis of independent 
prima facie obligations that arise 
out of past gifts and services en-
ables us to see the place of pro-
creation and the gift of life in our 
moral lives. Narveson was unable 
to see the independent moral sig-
nificance of procreation because 
he could not see an obligation 
that was not specifically linked 
to future benefits. By seeing a 
source of duty independently 
arising out of past gifts we can 
argue, in a way that Narveson 
was unable to, for the prima facie 
obligation to procreate. Further-
more we do not need to involve 
o~rselves in the logical complica-
tions which Narveson suggests 
surround any attempt to speak 
of the unborn in these contextsY 
The life that each of us has as 
independent selves is the most 
PI'Ofound and meaningful gift that 
· each of us has been given. With-
out it all else would be useless. 
The procreative powers of ~an 
are not just another pleasure pro-
d u c i n g biological mechanism. 
;r'hey are the deeply personal way 
1b which this gift of life is repaid. 
They are the way in which our 
February, 1975 
obligations of gratitude are ful-
filled and human life is sustained 
on t h i s planet. Without the 
morally judicious use of t hese 
powers the bio-social matrix that 
nurtures and sustains human life 
would cease to exist.18 The sense 
of gratitude for the gift of life is 
a powerful source of obligation to 
sustain the bio-social organism 
that makes human life possible at 
all. 
The Procreative Act: 
Sustaining Human Life 
The procreative act is basic to 
the maintenance of human life 
and community; the "order of 
creation," to use a t heological 
phrase, could not be sustained 
without it. 19 The obligation to 
procreate is thus neither obscure 
nor fundamentally mistaken. In 
the procreative act men affirm 
their willingness to sustain hu-
man life on t his planet. They bear 
witness to the goodness of human 
life and the matrix that makes it 
possible. In the procreative act 
men profoundly commit t hem-
selves to the future of the human 
community in general and ·of the 
society in which they live. zo They 
have become, as Burke put it, "a 
clause in the great primeval con-
tract of eternal society." The 
great religious traditions of the 
west have said that procreation 
is sacred. By this they have ex-
pressed their recognition of the 
irreducible moral significance of 
the procreative act. Narveson's 
failure to see any deeper signifi-
cance to procreation than the 
pleasure some people derive from 
45 
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young children attests. ~o t~e f~il­
ure of his brand of utlbtariamsm 
to explain adequately the moral 
significance of the procreative 
act. 
Perhaps the most immediate 
objection to this view is that it 
contains no check on the procrea-
tion of unlimited numbers and 
surely such a position is wrong. 
Two points, however, strongl_y 
mitigate this objection. Fi_rst, It 
must be insisted that t his has 
only established the prima facie 
obligation of procreation. It has 
not and by its nature could not 
have argued for the actual duty 
of procreation in every single 
case.zt For example, a couple who 
has already had two or three ch_il-
dren may find that the commit-
ments they have made to those 
children preclude any other com-
mitments to new children because 
these new commitments could not 
be fulfilled in a satisfactory man-
ner. In another case, a soldier. in 
a just war may find that his pnor 
moral commitments preclude hav-
ing any offspring at all. Thus i~ 
important ways the prima facze 
nature of the case made here does 
not necessarily mean that ev~ry­
one will have unlimited offsprmg. 
Secondly, one must keep in 
mi~d what was said earlier about 
the crealion of new life. The cre-
ation of viable new life occu~s 
in a bio-social matrix. Certam 
pro-natalist arguments h~ve for-
gotten this and end up m great 
difficulty by advocating con-
tinued biological reproduction at 
an unhindered rate while neglect-
ing the social m a t r i x that is 
46 
equally important for tht pro-
creation of viable new life. am 
prepared to argue that if H ; so-
cial matrix is seen as an qual 
part of t he procreation pl cess, 
then a theory of procreativ obli-
gations will not lead to unl tited 
population ,increase but _c 1 re-
quire precisely the opposii 
Procreative obligations stem 
from the obligation to r rture 
and support human life a a re-
payment for the gift of li that 
each ·of us has been giver Thus 
one has obligations towa. :5 the 
bio-social matrix that crea ~ new 
life. In this fashion ont could 
very easily support famil plan-
ning programs whose pm _,se is 
to maintain and foster viable 
family units and socio- ~ ltural 
units whose stable pres ce is 
necessary to the procref on of 
Wh t th ,recise new life. a ever e 
nature or dimensions of t .:! pop-
ulation problem, a subjer which 
is open to wide dispute, t does 
seem likely that some ·rm of 
population limitation mu~ be en-
couraged in the decade" ahead. 
From the moral perspect . ve out-
lined in this essay such P· ograms 
could be supported in~ far . as 
vastly in c rea sed po ulatJ?n 
threatens the viability oi the bw· 
social matrix to which o te owes 
such a profound debt of grat itude 
for the gift of life. For example, 8 
great deal is coming to be k~o'~ 
about the necessity for emotwn f 
support in the development 0 
· 11 for Young children and especJa Y 
· con· the development of loVIng 
cern for others.22 A family thus 
might find it morally obligatorY 
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to limit its offspring rather se-
verely in order t o maintain a high 
level of emotional support for al-
ready present children as a pre-
requisite for their growth into 
morally sensitive adults. In this 
way, the argument that I have 
sketched above does not pose any 
obstacles to family planning pro-
grams that are acceptable on oth-
er grounds, both moral and fac-
tual. It would, however, have a 
real effect en the acceptability of 
certain specific proposals and on 
the way in which the problem is 
stated and debated in the public 
arena. Lef us consider some of 
these impacts in the last section. 
Moral argument in the social 
arena concerns not only the par-
ticular proposal being supported 
but the method of argumentation 
that is being used to marshall the 
populace on its behalf. This is be-
cause a pattern of thinking about 
moral issues that blots out sig-
nificant elements of the moral 
calculus in support of noble ends 
can easily be transferred to less 
noble goals where the inability to 
see the full range of moral ele-
ments may be harmful or worse. 
The position advanced above 
calls into question the kind of 
reasoning so obviously manifest 
in the quotation above from 
Chasteen and which could be 
. echoed by reams of other quota-
tions from the literature on the 
"population problem." By failing 
to take account of obligations 
other than the obligation to pro-
duce benefits one can easily move 
to less than desirable means of 
Population limitation. For exam-
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ple, schemes for forcible steriliza-
tion of certain target groups be-
come legitimated because the 
positive moral significance of pro-
creation is not taken account of 
by those who see population 
limitation as the way to the 
maximization of the good. The 
argument advanced above will 
call int9 question certain specific 
proposals advanced on behalf of 
population limitation. As an ex-
ample let us examine one such 
proposal. 23 
Hardin's Proposal 
In a recent publication Garret 
Hardin advances an interesting 
proposal for changing public at-
titudes toward marriage and pro-
creation. In order to avoid mis-
representing him I shall let him 
speak for himself: 
Another useful step we might take 
is to start putting new ideas into 
the heads of young people especia l-
ly young girls. By young I mean 
first. second and t hird graders. W e 
need to teach them that it is not 
necessary for them to become mom-
mies when they grow up, and that 
if they do become mommies they 
need to introduce into the Dick and 
Jane readers some characters othe r 
than Jane's mommy a nd daddy 
a nd the couple next door whose 
children are named Carol and Jack 
and Tom, and the neighbors across 
the street with their three or four 
children. Perhaps we need to know 
Dick a nd Jane's Aunt Debbie, a 
swinging single of 40, who's as pret-
ty as a picture. Now we don 't have 
to tell these first graders what kind 
of fine time she is having. They 
need only to see he r with a smile 
on her face, see that she likes chil-
dren and is comfortable with them. 
Aunt Debbie isn't a sour old maid 
who hates kids. She loves young-
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sters but doesn't want them around 
her all the time; it's e nough for 
her to visit her nieces and ne phews. 
And when she isn't vis iting them. 
she lives a different kind of life -
and it's a good life. 
There are too many now who 
marry because they think they 
have to. Some of these p eople in 
their heart of hearts don 't want to 
have children, but they cannot re-
sist the social pressure. S o it is im-
portant to get into the schools the 
notion that there are alternative 
goals to marriage and parenthood. 
If we can get this message across 
we not only can diminish the birth 
rate but we can diminish also a 
great deal of heartache ; because 
semi-re luctant pa rents statistically 
speaking t e n d to become only 
grudgingly reconciled parents. We 
want to make it possible for them 
to live a good life, respected by the 
community, that does n o t involve 
having children. While such educa-
tion does not coerce the children, 
we may have to coerce the educa-
tors. We may have some serious 
battles ahead when we introduce 
Aunt Debbie into the first grade 
reader fo~ the first time, but I 
think we've got to face this. I think 
we can win this battle.24 
To begin with, there are some 
entirely praiseworthy aspects to 
this proposaL The legitimation of 
smaller families is sound and per-
haps desirable. It is also undoubt-
edly true that many may feel 
overly guilty for remaining single; 
perhaps some early examples may 
help to lessen the guilt and the 
anxiety. But I am concerned here 
with the deeper implications of 
Hardin's proposaL What this pro-
posal implies is that there is noth-
ing morally different between 
procreation and parenthood, and 
singleness. So long as Aunt ·Deb-
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hie is happy it's just fine. I rdin 
admits that many people c feel 
compelled to procreate and tam-
tain families but he can set oth-
ing more significant in thi than 
social pressure. He seems o be 
unable or unwilling to rec ,ize 
that the obligation to pr1 ·eate 
felt by mariy can be grour :!d in 
a moral perspective that , en-
tirely laudable and a go< deal 
more substantial than m a so-
cial pressure. 
What this proposal o' looks 
is the idea that procreatJ ' and 
singlehood are not nee ..;arily 
morally equal. Under t pro-
posal as he h~s presented there 
does not seem to be an) aason 
to avoid simply drawing >ts to 
determine whether to bc. Jme a 
parent or remain single. dmit-
tedly there may be laud[' e rea-
sons for remaining sin~ But 
Hardin parlays reasons t ' t may 
be good in some situati1 s into 
a general theory, and !re he 
proves too much. In th~ earlier 
sections of this essay I a ued at 
some length the difficl ies of 
utilitarian moral theory , he ar-
gument does not need r• ea~in?· 
What Hardin's proposal l tta1ls IS 
precisely the kind of posi on that 
Narveson took; there · .u e no 
moral reasons independe t of the 
production of happiness ' r pleas-
ure that could lead on<. to pro-
create. We saw the diffit .tlties of 
this position earlier.25 
But suppose Hardin's proposal 
was adopted somewhere. A young 
person confronted with two at-
tractively presented role models 
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asks how he is to choose the pat-
tern of his life. What criteria is 
he to use, what morally sensitive 
guidance is he to receive? Hard-
in's proposal seems to say to him 
that he is to follow his desire, or 
"seek your greatest happiness." 
But under his own ground rules 
Hardin could not object if every-
one chose not to procreate as the 
way to enhance their own happi-
ness. The nurture of the young 
is not an easy task; often it takes 
great personal sacrifice - physi-
cal, emotional, and material. Par-
ents sometimes die for their chil-
dren, or forego great material 
goods on behalf of their offspring. 
But under Hardin's proposal 
Aunt Debbie would be wiser than 
any of these: she would be fol-
lowing her own desires, seeking 
her own happiness. It does not 
seem very difficult to see how 
Hardin's Aunt Debbie and her 
ethical theory would be a great 
deal more appealing to the young 
who are only in the process of de-
veloping their moral sensitivities 
beyond a concern for self. At a 
critical period in the life of the 
young, Hardin seems to want to 
inculcate them with a rather in-
adequate moral theory. 
Sensitivity to Ethical Issues 
If the argument presented in 
the first sections of this essay is 
correct then the moral perspec-
tive of Hardin's proposal is quite 
unsatisfactory. As I suggested be-
fore, however, there are excellent 
elements in Hardin's proposal. 
What Hardin's ideas lack is some 
sensitivity to the idea that there 
February, 1975 
a re prima facie obligations for 
procreation that cannot be equat-
ed with Aunt Debbie's utili-
tarianism. In order to handle the 
difficulties I h a v e suggested, 
Hardin could modify his proposal. 
One fruitful approach might be to 
have Aunt Debbie engaged in 
some occupation that precludes, 
on morally laudatory grounds, 
her having a family. For example, 
Aunt Debbie could be a military 
officer manning vital defense in-
st allations, who comes to visit 
once in awhile. She could tell the 
children at home about her ex-
citing work and how important 
it is, etc. Grade school readers are 
not text books on moral phi-
losophy; but if the worthwhile 
goal of suggesting other alterna-
tives than marriages and large 
families is to be pursued it should 
be done with a great deal more 
sensitivity to the ethical issues 
involved than simply showing 
Aunt Debbie as a happy person. 
What my suggestion does is to 
add some specifics that qualify 
Aunt Debbie's singleness. They 
give her some morally support-
able reasons for being sit:tgle that 
do not undermine the growing 
moral sensitivity of the young. 
They provide an example that 
could be useful in later moral ed-
ucation and in the development 
of those moral sensitivities which 
must be included in any serious 
moral theory: sensitivities which 
cast a great deal of doubt on the 
kind of utilitarianism seemingly 
advocated by Aunt Debbie and 
through her, Hardin himself. 
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Conclusion 
The moral issues surrounding 
the procreation of new life are 
many and complex. One essay 
cannot hope to mention all of the 
problems. Questions of distribu-
tive justice, of individual rights, 
of social welfare all impinge on 
the procreative process and upon 
what has been various termed 
"the population problem." This 
essay has attempted the modest 
task of suggesting a morally sen-
sitive alternative to certain views 
of the procreative process that 
seem to be widely held in certain 
circles. I have been concerned 
here to argue that there are pro-
found sources of the obligation to 
procreate that are being over-
looked by those discussions of 
the population problem that fol-
low the foundations of teleologi-
cal-utilitarian ethics. 
If the argument advanced here 
is fundamentally sound, then a 
fresh look at state control or 
coercion in the procreation proc-
ess as advocated by many will 
be necessary. Moreover a more 
sophisticated and sensitive dis-
cussion of the decisions of indi-
viduals to procreate or not to pro-
create will also be a result of 
moving the discussion out of the 
utilitarian arena. To these ends 
this essay is only the first step. It 
is hoped that more serious work 
will follow. 
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The Obstetrician's Prayer 
Pebruary, 1975 
Almighty God, Creator and Give r of 
life. thro ugh the merits of Thine only 
begotten Son J esus, and His Im-
maculate Mother Mary. grant a safe 
delivery to this mothe r a nd her infant. 
0 Holy Spirit! Give me good judge-
ment and direct my hands in the per-
formance of this task. May this child 
be reared to know. love and serve Thee 
and the reby gain everlas ting life. 
Amen. 
Mothe r of Mothers, pray for us. 
(Printed copies available from W. F. 
Preston, M.D., 2222 W . 17th St., Wil-
mington, Delaware 19806.) 
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